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Bargaining with a Shared Interest:  





Bargaining often occurs between parties with some shared interest. Partnerships, joint ventures, 
and cross ownership are examples. We extend standard bargaining models to allow for joint 
ownership. Joint ownership reduces costly bargaining disputes, as bargainers’ interests are more 
aligned. We then test the theory with collective bargaining data, where employee stock 
ownership plans (ESOPs) are the source of joint ownership. The theory predicts that ESOPs will 
lead to a reduction in strike incidence and the fraction of labor disputes that involve a strike. We 
examine these predictions using U.S. bargaining data from 1970-1995. The data suggest that 
ESOPs do increase the efficiency of labor negotiations by shifting the composition of disputes 
away from costly strikes. Consistent with improved bargaining efficiency, we find that the 
announcement of a union ESOP leads to a 50% larger stock market reaction as compared to the 
announcement of a nonunion ESOP.  
 
 
JEL No.: J52 (Collective Bargaining), C78 (Bargaining Theory), D82 (Asymmetric and Private 
Information) 
 
Keywords: Bargaining, collective bargaining, ESOP, cross ownership, joint venture, strikes, 
dispute resolution, dispute costs    
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Bargaining often occurs between parties with at least some shared interest. Examples 
include partnerships, joint ventures, cross-ownership, profit sharing, and household bargaining. 
Yet standard bargaining models ignore the variety of ownership structures seen in practice. This 
paper extends the standard bargaining models to allow for joint ownership. In the standard 
theory, costly bargaining disputes arise from incomplete information (Ausubel, Cramton, 
Deneckere, 2002). We show that bargaining efficiency improves with joint ownership. Even 
modest joint ownership can have a large impact on expected dispute costs. 
We then test the theory with collective bargaining data. Employee Stock Ownership 
Plans (ESOPs) are the source of joint ownership in our data. By 1992, many companies adopted 
ESOPs in response to changes in the tax law and other factors. Consistent with the theory we 
find that joint ownership reduces strike incidence. Further, we find the benefit of ESOP adoption 
by unionized firms is capitalized in the stock price. 
The growth in ESOPs in the 1980s fostered a considerable literature into the reasons for 
their adoption and their impacts on the adopting firm. ESOPs are ―qualified pension‖ plans that 
were given explicit recognition and tax incentives by the Employee Retirement Incomes Security 
Act of 1974 (ERISA). In 1980, 4,925 ESOP plans existed covering approximately 5.3 million 
workers. By 1995, the number of plans had increased to 9,232 with coverage expanding to 7.2 
million workers.
1 Beginning in 1988, it is possible to identify ESOPs that are established as a 
part of a collective bargaining agreement. As of 1991, union ESOPs covered 1.1 million workers, 
6.6% of all private sector workers covered by collective bargaining agreements. In the same 
year, nonunion ESOPs covered 5.5 million workers, 6.4% of all private sector nonunion 
                                                 
1 See DOL (1999).  
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workers.
2 That is, by the early 1990s ESOPs had become as prevalent in unionized as in 
nonunionized firms. 
Despite the relative prevalence of ESOPs in unionized firms, there has been little research 
on the likely impact of ESOPs on collective bargaining. Ben-Ner and Jun (1996) develop a 
screening model of bargaining that allows the union to use an ESOP to buy a majority equity 
stake in the firm. In their model, during a contract negotiation the union’s initial offer to the firm 
consists of a wage demand and a buyout price. High valuation firms accept the wage demand 
with no labor dispute, low valuation firms accept the buyout price again with no labor dispute, 
and labor disputes screen the remaining intermediate firm types. The buyout option lowers the 
overall dispute rate and dispute duration by providing the union with an additional screening 
device. 
While including ESOPs as a buyout option in a screening model is an interesting 
theoretical extension, this option is rarely exercised in practice. Figure 1 shows the distribution 
of ESOP ownership shares in our data of ESOPs at unionized firms. Less than three percent of 
these ESOPs involve a controlling interest in the firm.
3 The ownership share for the typical union 
ESOP is substantially below 50%. 
In this paper, we examine the impact of ESOPs on the collective bargaining process when 
the union has a noncontrolling ownership interest in the firm. This conforms to nearly all union 
ESOPs observed in the data. Rather than focusing on the adoption of an ESOP as a bargaining 
outcome, we focus instead on the effect that an existing ESOP has on current contract 
negotiations. We do this by extending the signaling model of Cramton and Tracy (1992) to allow 
                                                 
2 We thank Doug Kruse for tabulating the number of participants in collectively bargained ESOPs from 
the IRS Form 5500 data. 
3 The best known example unions using an ESOP to gain a controlling interest in a company was the 
union buyout of United Airlines in 1993. Cott and Stuart (1995) provide a useful summary of this buyout.  
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the union members to hold an equity stake in the firm. The ESOP causes the union to internalize 
to a degree the costs to the firm associated with labor disputes. As the union’s equity stake 
grows, we show that the union is less likely to select the strike threat and that the firm is more 
likely to accept the union’s initial wage offer. ESOPs, then, are predicted to shift the composition 
of disputes from strikes towards holdouts.
4 
We test these predictions using a sample of U.S. contract negotiations. Unionized firms 
that adopt an ESOP with greater than a 10 percent ownership stake do not appear to have any 
significantly different bargaining experience prior to the ESOP adoption than unionized firms 
that do not adopt an ESOP. In contrast, firms that adopt an ESOP with less than a 10 percent 
ownership stake experienced a significantly higher fraction of labor disputes that took the form 
of a strike during the pre-adoption period. The data indicate a decline in the incidence of strikes 
following the adoption of an ESOP with less than a 10 percent ownership stake. In addition, 
following the adoption of the ESOP these same firms experience a reduction in the fraction of 
labor disputes that take the form of a strike. However, the data do not find any significant impact 
of larger ESOPs on collective bargaining outcomes. The data, then, provide some evidence of 
ESOPs altering the relative attractiveness of the strike and the holdout threats. 
The signaling model predicts that ESOPs should improve the efficiency of collective 
bargaining by reducing the incidence of costly strikes. This improved bargaining efficiency 
creates value for the firm’s shareholders over and above any of the traditional arguments for why 
ESOPs should lead to higher profitability. This suggests that the announcement of a union ESOP 
should generate a larger stock market reaction than for the announcement of a non-union ESOP. 
We test this prediction by conducting an event study of ESOP adoptions. We find that the 
                                                 
4 Holdouts are labor disputes in which the union agrees to work under the terms of the expired labor 
agreement while negotiations continue. In a holdout, the union puts pressure on the firm using a variety of 
tactics such as ―work-to-rule.‖  
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announcement of a union ESOP leads to a differentially larger stock market reaction as 
compared to the announcement of a non-union ESOP.  
As mentioned, an ESOP is just one example of cross ownership or other shared interest. 
Cross ownership ties the success of each company to its partners. As a result, the companies have 
better incentives in negotiating and investing in long-term supply relationships. Bargaining costs 
are reduced and the companies enjoy a more productive collaboration. Our analysis is relevant to 
the study of bargaining with shared interests more generally. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe important features of 
ESOP pension plans. In section 3, we show how standard bargaining models can be extended to 
allow joint ownership. We discuss the data and present our findings in section 4. We conduct in 
section 5 an event study of the announcement of a new ESOP to explore the implications of 
ESOPs for the firm's shareholders. The final section contains thoughts for future work. 
2.  A primer on ESOPs 
ESOPs were formally sanctioned in 1974 as a type of retirement plan under ERISA. A firm that 
wants  to  set  up  an  ESOP  establishes  a  trust  fund  in  which  to  make  contributions.  These 
contributions are allocated to individual worker accounts held by the trust. Allocation formulas 
vary in practice but are based on factors such as the worker's level of compensation and years of 
service. Vesting of assets allocated to worker accounts takes one of two forms: no vesting for the 
first five years, followed by 100% vesting; or 20% vesting after three years, and 20% per year 
for the next four years. The nondiscrimination requirement stipulates that ―highly compensated‖ 
employees cannot account for more than 30% of participants in the ESOP.
5 
An important feature of ESOPs for understanding their incentive effects for collective 
                                                 
5 Qualified plans must meet nondiscrimination tests regarding (a) coverage and (b) nondiscrimination in 
plans features.  Each of these tests can be met through a variety of tests.  Plans covering collectively 
bargained employees are effectively exempted from these rules.  
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bargaining is that at least fifty percent of the ESOP's assets must be invested in the employer’s 
securities. While other deferred compensation plans may in fact hold significant amounts of 
employer securities, they are not compelled to do so. Workers with 10 years of plan participation 
can begin to diversify their ESOP account when they reach age 55.
6  This diversification option 
continues until the worker reaches age 60, when he/she is given a one-time option to diversify up 
to 50% of his/her account.
7 The employee receives the vested assets in his/her account at the end 
of the employment relationship with the firm.
8 
Shares in an ESOP are legally owned by the ESOP trust. The control rights to these 
shares reside in the trustee of the plan, who is typically appointed by management. The trustee of 
the ESOP votes all nonallocated shares. In public companies, the plan participants must be 
allowed to vote their shares on ―voting issues.‖
9 Fiduciary decisions, for example the 
consideration of a tender offer, need not be passed through to the participants. However, the 
ESOP can be set up so that this authority is given to the plan participants for decisions on 
allocated shares. Most public companies do structure their ESOPs in this manner (Rosen, Snyder, 
and Young 1993). 
Motives for adopting an ESOP have been explored in the literature. First, Delaware law 
makes ESOPs a potential takeover defense.
10 A firm incorporated in Delaware must wait three 
years after it acquires 15% of the target firm’s equity before it can merge with the target, unless 
it can obtain a waiver by 85% of the shareholders. In 1989, Polaroid won a decision in Delaware 
Court that upheld the company decision to issue 14% of its stock to an ESOP prior to the 
                                                 
6 See Oringer (2001). 
7 This requirement applies to ESOP shares allocated to worker accounts after December 31, 1986. 
8 See http://www.esopassociation.org/whatis/howdo.html 
9 I.R.C. § 4975(e)(7) (1989). 
10 General Corporation Law SS 203, effective 2 February 1988.  
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initiation of a hostile tender offer by Shamrock Holdings. Management may feel that giving 
voting rights to the union through an ESOP is a way of placing the votes in ―friendly‖ hands 
(e.g., Chang and Myers 1992 and Chaplinsky and Niehaus 1994). Second, ESOPs were given 
special tax incentives in order to encourage their adoption. The specifics of these tax benefits, 
though, are not directly relevant for our purpose. Interested readers can find a detailed discussion 
in Beatty (1995) and Scholes and Wolfson (1990). Finally, ESOPs may improve worker 
productivity by giving workers an equity stake in the firm. Considerable effort has been devoted 
to pinning down the productivity effects of profit-sharing in general, and ESOPs in particular 
(Kruse 1993, Bell and Kruse 1995, and Kruse and Blasi 1995).  Kim and Ouimet (2009) examine 
the effect of adoption of ESOPs on workers’ wages and document an increase in wages for large 
ESOPs in concentrated industries.   
The net impact of ESOPs on a firm's profitability can be assessed by conducting an event 
study of the announcement effect of a new ESOP. The announcement of a new ESOP on average 
is viewed in a positive light by investors. Studies have found that the average two day 
cumulative excess stock return on the day prior to and the day of an ESOP announcement ranges 
from one to three percent (Gordon and Pound 1990 and Beatty 1995).
11 
3.  Incorporating ESOPs into a bargaining model 
It is often argued that ESOPs serve to improve worker incentives by giving individual 
workers ownership in the firm. The difficulty with this argument is that any given worker’s 
performance has only a negligible impact on the firm’s profitability. A rational worker, outside 
of top management, should not alter his/her behavior as a result of an ESOP. However, the 
                                                 
11 This announcement effect captures more than just the tax benefits of an ESOP since it has been 
documented that stock prices react positively to ESOP adoption even when there is no tax benefit (and 
adopting companies are takeover targets). See Sellers, Hagan, and Siegel (1994) for further discussion.  
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impact of even a small ESOP on collective bargaining can be dramatic. This is because collective 
bargaining avoids the dissipation of incentives that is seen at the individual worker level. As a 
result, the presence of an ESOP will affect the union’s wage demand and its decision to strike. 
To assess the impact of an ESOP on collective bargaining we extend the wage bargaining 
model of Cramton and Tracy (1992). The model assumes one-sided private information in which 
the union is uncertain about the firm’s profitability. The firm credibly signals its profitability 
through its willingness to postpone agreement. The union decides how best to pressure the firm 
by selecting the threat, either strike or holdout. Under holdout, the union continues to work under 
the terms of the expired labor agreement, but at a reduced level of efficiency. In contrast, striking 
typically involves a substantial disruption of production. We will see that an ESOP impacts not 
only wages, dispute incidence, and dispute duration, but also the form the dispute takes. 
Consider the following stylized labor contract negotiation. A union and a firm are 
bargaining over the wage to be paid during a contract of duration T. Let v be the firm’s value of 
the current union labor force working under a contract of duration T. It is common knowledge 
that v is drawn from the distribution F with positive density f on an interval of support [l, h]. 
However, at the outset of the negotiations only the firm knows the realized value of v. 
  Negotiations begin with the union selecting a threat  {H,S}, where H indicates the 
holdout threat and S indicates the strike threat. The union’s threat choice remains in effect until a 
settlement is reached. Absent an ESOP, in the threat , the payoff to the union is x and the 
payoff to the firm is a v  b, where a  [0,1) and b  0. The term 1  a captures the dispute 
cost in that threat. Define c = (b  x) / (1  a) to be the relative payment difference during the 
threat . Since the total payoff in agreement is v and the total payoff during the threat  is a v  
b + x , the ―pie‖ that the union and firm are bargaining over (the difference between the  
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agreement and the threat payoffs ) is (1  a )v + b  x = (1  a )(v + c). We assume that the 
pie is positive for all v  [l, h], which implies that c > l. 
  Let w
 0 denote the wage under the expired labor agreement. Since the terms and 
conditions of the previous labor agreement remain in force during a holdout, the workers 
continue to be paid w
0 during the holdout, so xH = bH = w
0 and cH = 0. We assume there is some 
inefficiency during a holdout, aH < 1.  
  With an ESOP, the union gets a share  of the profits of the firm. This changes the payoff 
flows both during the threat and after settlement as shown in Figure 2. The outcome of this 
bargaining process between the union and the firm denoted by t, w,  consists of the time of the 
settlement t where t [0,T], the wage settlement w and the threat selected by the union . The 
union and firm payoffs are calculated as the sum of the threat payoffs and the agreement payoffs, 
















to be the discounted fraction of time spent in dispute if an agreement occurs at time t. Then, 
given the bargaining outcome t, w, , the union’s payoff is  
( , , ) [ ( )] ( ) [ ( )][1 ( )] U t w x a v b D t w v w D t               
and the firm’s payoff is 
( , , ) (1 )( ) ( ) (1 )( )[1 ( )] V t w a v b D t v w D t            . 
 
Notice that the ESOP does not change the firm’s incentives. The firm still seeks to maximize its 
overall profits, despite the fact that a share  of these profits is going to the union. In contrast, 
the ESOP does fundamentally change the incentives of the union. With an ESOP, the union cares  
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not only about its wage, but also about the firm’s profitability, which falls with higher wages and 
longer and more costly labor disagreements. As a result, the ESOP makes the union a less 
demanding negotiator. As we will see, the ESOP gives the union an incentive to select a less 
destructive threat and to demand a lower initial wage demand. 
The bargaining sequence is as follows. Following the union’s threat choice the union and 
the firm alternate making wage offers, with the union assumed to make the initial offer. After a 
wage offer is made by one side, the other side has two options: (1) make a counteroffer, in which 
case the bargaining continues, or (2) accept the current offer, in which case the bargaining ends 
and labor is supplied at the offered wage for the reminder of the contract period. As in Admati 
and Perry (1987), a bargainer can delay responding to an offer. This assumption leads to the 
signaling equilibrium in which the firm signals its value through its willingness to delay the 
agreement. For simplicity, we assume that the minimum time between offers is arbitrarily small. 
  The equilibrium of this bargaining game takes a simple form. If the wage under the 
expired labor agreement, w
0, is sufficiently low (that is, below some indifference level w) the 
union decides to select the strike threat; otherwise (
0 ww  ) the union selects the holdout threat. 
The indifference level wage, w, depends on r, T, F, the strike and holdout threat payoffs and the 
ESOP size . A second indifference level, m  (l, h), determines the firm’s response to the 
union’s initial wage offer. If the firm’s valuation is higher than this indifference level,vm  , the 
firm accepts the union’s initial wage offer and an immediate settlement takes place. Otherwise, 
the firm rejects the union’s initial wage offer and a labor dispute begins. Whether the dispute is a 
strike or a holdout depends on the union’s prior threat choice. 
  The signaling equilibrium is characterized by three propositions, which are proven in 
Appendix A. 
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Proposition 1. Let   be the threat chosen by the union. In the limit as the time between offers 
goes to zero, there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with the following form: 
  The union makes an immediate offer of 
12
( ) (1 )( )
22
w m x a m c , where  










m c F m v c dF v
mc
. 
  The firm accepts the offer if v   m. Otherwise, if v < m the firm waits until  12 ()
vc
mc  of the 
contract period remains before offering
12
( ) (1 )( )
22
w v x a v c , which is accepted 
by the union. 
 
         Several observations follow from Proposition 1. First, all wage offers are Rubinstein (1982) 
full information wage offers. The wage offer consists of the union’s payoff in the threat , x , 







 of the bargaining rents (the avoided loss) based on the firm’s 
profitability, v (or m in the case of the union’s initial offer). For bargaining units without an 
ESOP ( = 0), the rents are split equally between the union and the firm with the union receiving 
its share of the rents entirely through the settlement wage. At the other extreme, for bargaining 
units with a controlling interest in the firm ( = ½), there is no longer any bargaining conflict 
between the firm and the union. The union receives a ―competitive‖ wage equal to its threat 
payoff, x . However, the union still collects half of the rents, v - x , though it now receives the 
payment entirely through its equity stake. For intermediate values of , the union receives some 
of its rents through the wage and some through its equity stake. Second, during a labor dispute  
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the union has every incentive to impose as much inefficiency on the firm as possible. The wage 
under both threats increases linearly with the degree of inefficiency, but the strength of this 
incentive diminishes with . 
  For a given threat , we can determine how the dispute incidence and duration respond to 
changes in the distribution of v, changes in the threat payoffs, or to changes in the size of the 
ESOP. The following proposition says that dispute activity increases with uncertainty. In 
addition, dispute activity increases when the threat  becomes more attractive to the union (i.e., 
c falls). However, dispute activity decreases with larger ESOPs (as  rises). 
Proposition 2. Suppose that m uniquely maximizes (M). Dispute incidence F(m) and dispute 
duration  12 ( ) 1 ( )
vc
Dv
mc  increase with a linear, mean-preserving spread of the 
distribution of F. Moreover, dispute incidence and duration decrease as c increases and as  
increases. 
  Dispute activity depends on the amount of uncertainty about the firm’s private 
information. Dispute incidence always exceeds one-half, and converges to one-half in the limit 
as uncertainty disappears.
12 Recall that c measures what the firm pays less what the union 
receives in the threat  scaled by the dispute cost. Proposition 2 yields several testable 
predictions. For example, if a local union receives strike benefits throughout a strike from its 
national union (and the costs of the benefits are spread across the national membership), then this 
lowers cS which should increase strike incidence and lengthen strike durations. Similarly, if 
workers on strike qualify for general welfare payments, this also lowers  S c  and should increase 
the incidence and duration of strikes. 
                                                 
12 By dispute incidence we mean the likelihood that either a strike or a holdout takes place. Dispute 
incidence less than one-half results when there is a fixed cost to initiating a dispute.  
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  The intuition for why ESOPs reduce dispute incidence and dispute duration stems from 
the fact that as  increases the union’s preferences become more in line with the firm. A 
bargaining unit without an ESOP receives rents only through the negotiated wage. Labor 
disputes are a costly activity that allows the union to raise its wage. A bargaining unit with an 
ESOP no longer collects its rents entirely through the negotiated wage. Depending on the size of 
the ESOP, a portion of the union’s rents is now collected through its ownership stake in the firm. 
As the ESOP share  increases, the union collects a higher share of its rents through its equity 
stake, which dampens the union’s incentive to invest in costly labor disputes in order to raise its 
wage. At  = ½, all of the union’s rents are collected through its equity stake and there is nothing 
left to disagree about. Consequently, dispute incidence and duration vanishes to zero.  
  Our third proposition demonstrates that the union’s threat decision depends critically on 
the current wage under the expired labor agreement, w
0. 
Proposition 3. If 
0 ww  , the union selects the strike threat; if 
0 ww   the union selects the 
holdout threat, where 
 
(1 )( )(1 ( )) (1 ) (1 ( ))
( (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ))
1
S H
S S S S S H H H
m m
S S S S H
ll
w x a m c F m a m F m
c a F m a vdF v a vdF v


       
     
 
 
and mS = m(cS) and mH = m(cH) maximize (M). 
The intuition is that the union will select the strike threat if and only if the higher bargaining 
costs that are associated with a strike are more than made up for by a higher wage. If the current 
wage under the expired labor agreement is sufficiently high, this is not the case and the union 
prefers the holdout threat.  
  Proposition 3 provides a key insight into strike activity. The overall incidence of strikes 
depends not just on the overall incidence of disputes, but also on the fraction of disputes that 
involve a strike. As shown earlier, the level of dispute activity depends on the degree of  
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uncertainty and the size of the ESOP. The composition of disputes between strikes and holdouts 
depends on 
0 w , the size of the ESOP, the threat payoffs and the location of the distribution of v.  
We would like to determine how the size of the ESOP impacts the composition of disputes. 
An examination of the Rubinstein wage provides some insight: 
 
12
( ) (1 )( )
22
w v x a v c .  
We see that as  increases, the wage under both threats falls. However, assuming that the strike 
threat is much more destructive than the holdout threat (aS << aH), then it is the case that as the 
ESOP share increases the wage under the strike threat is falling much faster than the wage under 
the holdout threat. A higher ESOP share reduces the relative wage gap between the strike and the 
holdout threats. Hence, we should expect that an ESOP should increase the relative attractiveness 
of the holdout threat. The incentive to strike is further reduced when the union factors in the 
dispute costs. The less destructive threat, holdout, results in lower dispute costs. Thus, our 
intuition is that we should expect ESOPs to shift the composition of disputes away from strikes. 
  This intuition is difficult to establish without making further assumptions on the threat 
payoffs. One useful simplification is  
Assumption S. bS = xS. 
This states that what the firm pays out during a strike is equal to what the union receives 
implying that cS = 0.
13 In the case of holdout, recall that the firm pays the union the wage from 
the expired contract, which means bH = xH = w
0, and cH = 0. Thus, with Assumption S, cH = cS = 
0, which implies that the union selects the same cutoff level m under either threat (m = mS = mH). 
As a result, the incidence and duration of the dispute is the same under either threat. Since aS < 
                                                 
13 Assumption S can hold in a variety of situations. If the firm closes down during a strike and the union 
workers do not find alternative employment, then the assumption holds. Similarly, if the firm hires 
replacements at a competitive wage and the striking workers find alternative employment at the 
competitive wage then the assumption also holds.  
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aH , it immediately follows that the expected loss from a strike is higher than the expected loss 
from a holdout. In addition, we can show 
Proposition 4. Suppose Assumption S holds and m is the unique maximizer of (M). Then as  
increases from 0, w falls and the union is more apt to choose the holdout threat. Moreover, if v 
is uniformly distributed, then for all , the union’s threat choice shifts toward holdout as the size 
of the ESOP grows. 
Propositions 1–4 yield a number of predictions about how collective bargaining changes 
with the introduction of an ESOP. As a union’s equity position in the firm grows, we should 
expect fewer and shorter disputes. Moreover, the union should be less apt to select the more 
destructive strike threat, and thus strike incidence should be less. To get a sense of the magnitude 
of these effects, we set the model parameter values to the benchmark levels of Cramton and 
Tracy (1994). These parameter values were calibrated such that the equilibrium outcome with  
= 0 (no ESOP) fits the descriptive statistics of private-sector collective bargaining in large (more 
than 1,000 workers) private-sector bargaining units in the U.S. from 1970 to 1989.
14 
Figure 3 shows how dispute incidence changes in the benchmark model with the 
introduction of an ESOP. Overall dispute incidence declines slowly as the ESOP ownership 
share increases from 0 to 25 percent. However, there is a substantial change in the form that 
disputes take, resulting in a large decline in strike incidence. Strike incidence, initially at 11 
percent with  = 0 falls roughly linearly to 0 at  = 0.17. This decline in strike incidence is the 
result of the union avoiding the more costly strike threat when the union has an equity interest in 
the firm. Table 3 summarizes the implications of the calibrated model for the sample of ESOPs 
in our data. We use the distribution of ESOPs sizes in our data to calculate a weighted average 
                                                 
14 Specifically, we assume v is uniform on 1  0.07, w
0 is uniform on 0.48  0.05, aS = 0.75, aH = 0.96, xS 
= bS = 0.35, r = 10%, and T = 2.7 years.  
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impact of the ESOP on bargaining outcomes. Strike incidence for the sample is predicted to 
decline by 5.6 percentage points, while the fraction of disputes that involve a strike is predicted 
to decline by 10.7 percentage points. 
Figure 4 shows how the expected loss from disputes declines as the union’s ESOP 
ownership share increases. The expected loss conditional on the strike threat is cut in one-half as 
 increases from 0 to 0.25—this is the consequence of the mean strike duration dropping from 
36 days at  = 0 to 18 days at  = 0.25. However, the expected loss from disputes drops by a 
factor of more than four as  increases from 0 to 0.25. The faster decline in the dispute loss is the 
result of two sources of reduction as the union’s equity interest increases: 1) shorter disputes and 
2) the shift away from the more costly strike threat.  
The decline in dispute costs with the introduction of an ESOP raises the possibility that 
both the union and the firm may benefit from the ESOP, all else equal. In our benchmark model, 
this is not the case. With  = 0, the union and firm split the pie roughly equally, but as the 
union’s ownership share increases to 20 percent, the split shifts to 60/40 in favor of the union. 
This suggests that firms would offer ESOPs only in conjunction with some combination of tax 
breaks and concessions by the union. 
To summarize, the benchmark model—calibrated to fit the main features of U.S. 
collective bargaining—suggests several hypotheses: 1) ESOPs should result in lower strike 
incidence, strike duration and fraction of disputes involving a strike, 2) ESOPs should result in 
lower expected dispute costs, and 3) ESOPs should be associated with union concessions. The 
size of the ESOP impact depends on the union’s ownership share of the firm. According to the 
benchmark model, the average impact of ESOPs based on the observed distribution of ESOP 
shares (see Figure 1) is as follows: dispute incidence falls from 51.8 to 51.6 percent, strike 
incidence falls from 11.1 to 5.5 percent, and the union’s selection of the strike threat falls from  
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21.4 to 10.7 percent. 
 
4.  ESOP data and empirical findings 
Our primary data source for ESOP information was the National Center for Employee 
Ownership (NCEO). For each publicly held corporation, we used NCEO data to determine 
whether an ESOP exists, the date the ESOP was adopted, and the percent of total shares held by 
the ESOP.  We sent surveys to 387 corporations where there was any indication of possible error 
in the NCEO data. A total of 268 companies responded to the survey, although about a third of 
responses were not informative since the plan administrators claimed that they did not have 
information about the specific circumstances surrounding the adoption of their ESOPs. We made 
corrections to the data based on the usable survey responses. In addition, we checked the 
accuracy of our ESOP data against those reported in Chang and Mayers (1992), Gordon and 
Pound (1990), and Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1994). Finally, we cross-checked our data with the 
information provided to the Internal Revenue Service in the Form 5500.
15 We were unable to 
check the accuracy of ESOPs that were put into place before 1988 due to the fact that many of 
these companies were subsequently delisted. Our final ESOP sample for which we have 
complete data consists of 142 firms.  
Our collective bargaining data consists of all private sector major bargaining units 
followed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) from 1970 to 1995.
16 The BLS compiles 
settlement, effective, and expiration dates for each round of contract negotiations. Strike 
beginning and ending dates are from BLS and Bureau of National Affairs data, and consist of 
                                                 
15 Every ESOP involving more than 100 participants must file a Form 5500 report with the Internal 
Revenue Service. Beginning in 1988, the Form 5500 data indicate if the ESOP is part of a collective 
bargaining unit. 
16 Major bargaining units cover 1,000 or more workers. The BLS stopped collecting bargaining data on 
major bargaining units at the end of 1995.  
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compilations from public sources. Each bargaining unit is assigned a unique identification 
number by the BLS. A total of 1,101 bargaining units and 6,585 negotiations are captured in the 
data. Since our ESOP data only covers public companies, we restrict our sample to this set of 
firms. CUSIP numbers were merged in using the firm name listed by the BLS and data sources 
on mergers and acquisitions during the sample period. Valid CUSIP numbers were available for 
4,635 negotiations involving 715 bargaining units. A full set of control variables (described 
below) were available for 3,917 contract negotiations. 
We merged the sample of ESOPs into our collective bargaining data using the firm’s 
CUSIP number.  This merging had to be done with care to take account of any mergers and 
acquisitions, as well as instances where firms sell-off or acquire divisions that are covered by 
collective bargaining.
17 For example, a division of a company with its bargaining units covered 
by an ESOP may be sold to another company with no ESOP (or, alternatively, the division may 
go through a management/leverage buy out).
18 For our analysis, we tracked bargaining units and 
                                                 
17 If the firm is being acquired then the treatment of its ESOP is similar to a 401(k) plan -- the assets 
would be moved into a successor plan, usually a 401(k) in the acquirer. That plan might sell the shares if 
it is a large percentage of the acquirer s stock. Alternatively, the shares could be cashed out and 
employees could roll them into an IRA or pay taxes and keep the money, or the employees could simply 
be given the shares. 
 
18 A company that sells a division has a few options:  (a) without affirmative employer action, the 
affected employees are treated as any terminated employees. The vested employees can then receive 
distributions pursuant to the plan's general provisions, and unvested employees forfeit their interest. (b) 
the company could choose to vest all employees, and otherwise treat the employees under (a) above. (c) 
the employer could retain the funds in the ESOP, and give continuing vesting service for employment 
with the buyer. Under any of these options, the employer might also facilitate rollovers to the buyer’s plan 
(after liquidating the stock).  Alternatively, the seller could implement a ―trust-to-trust‖ transfer to the 
buyer's plan (again, with or without fully vesting--but usually after vesting). If a trust-to-trust transfer 
occurs, the buyer can either retain the stock fund (but freeze it) to enable the participants to retain 
favorable tax treatment (on net unrealized appreciation) upon distribution. However, most employers 
would prefer to liquidate the stock fund quickly. It should be noted that a partial termination requires full 
vesting.  A partial termination occurs if a significant percentage of a plan's population is terminated as the 
result of employer action. Over 50% termination is always a partial termination, under 20% is never a 
partial termination and anything between 20% and 50% is subject to evaluation based on facts and 
circumstances.  
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whether they are covered by the original ESOP plan.  We used Standard & Poors Compustat and 
Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) as primary source of data for tracking firms and 
divisions. For additional background detail, we used Securities Data Corporation data on asset 
sell-offs for restructuring in the 1990s, Moody’s Manuals, 10-Ks filed with the SEC, and 
Directory of Corporate Affiliates. Finally, we also deleted all contract negotiations in the airline 
and railroad industries since their bargaining is covered by different statutory and case law. 
The pattern of adoption of ESOPs over time in our data is presented in Table 1. Of the 
142 total ESOP plans that we linked to our bargaining data, around 2% were put into place in the 
year following the passage of ERISA. In the early to mid-1980s some ESOPs were put into place 
as part of concession bargaining by the firm.
19 Adoption rates significantly picked up in 1989, 
following the enhancement of some of the ESOP tax incentives and the Polaroid decision. 
Overall, ESOPs were adopted by 22% of the bargaining units in our data. A total of 74% 
of contract negotiations involve firms that never adopt an ESOP. For the bargaining units 
involving firms that adopt an ESOP, the negotiations prior to the adoption date represent 16% of 
the total sample, while the negotiations following the adoption date represent 10% of the total 
sample. The fact that many ESOPs are adopted late in our sample period implies that we should 
interpret any estimated impact as a short-run effect. 
Table 2 gives the distribution of ESOPs across broad industry classifications. The 
incidence of adoption among unionized firms is not uniform across industry classifications, and 
is relatively high in Petroleum & Coal and Transportation Equipment. By way of comparison, 
Bell and Kruse (1995) using Form 5500 data find that the overall incidence of ESOPs was 72.7% 
in Communications, 39.2% in Utilities, 11.3% in Manufacturing, and 11.7% in Finance, 
Insurance, and Real Estate. Bell and Kruse report that the incidence of ESOP adoption is three 
                                                 
19 See Flanagan (1984) for examples.  
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times higher in ―high technology‖ sectors than for the private sector as a whole. 
To investigate the impact of ESOPs on the collective bargaining process, we estimate 
strike incidence and dispute composition specifications using probit models. The dispute 
composition is fraction of labor disputes that involve a strike. We control for bargaining unit, 
firm, industry, and state level variables that may impact the likelihood of a strike or of a strike 
given a dispute. We also control for unobserved time-specific, union-specific, industry-specific 
and state-specific factors by including fixed effects for these factors. Let I
* be an unobserved 
continuous index of the propensity for a contract negotiation to result in a strike (or a strike 
conditional on a dispute). We model I
* as follows. 
      
     (   -    )      (    -    )                                         
                    , 
where Xi contains bargaining unit variables, Xf contains firm variables, Xj contains industry 
variables, and Xs contains variables for the state(s) covered by the bargaining unit, and I(pre-
esop) is an indicator takes on a value of one for a bargaining unit that adopts an ESOP for those 
contract negotiations that predate the ESOP adoption date, while I(post-esop) similarly takes on a 
value of one for those contract negotiations that follow the ESOP adoption date. The error 
components indicated by μ are the fixed effects for the negotiation year, union, 2-digit industry, 
and state(s) covered by the collective bargaining agreement. The error term ε is assumed to have 
a standard normal distribution. 
  For each contract negotiation we have an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the 
contract negotiation involved a strike. We assume that a strike occurs if the unobserved index I
* 
is positive. 
Iifjst = 1  if I
*
ijfst > 0 
        0  otherwise 
The likelihood of a strike is given by Ф(I(pre-esop)γ1 + I(post-esop)γ2 + Xitβ1 + Xftβ2 + Xjtβ3 +  
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Xstβ4 + μt + μu + μj + μs ) where Ф is the cumulative standard normal distribution function. 
  We report the marginal effect of variables on the likelihood of a strike (or a strike given a 
labor dispute). For continuous variables, we calculate this marginal effect as the average 
derivative as follows. 




   
       
   
where S is the set of negotiations that we use to calculate the average derivative. For the pre- and 
post-esop indicators, the marginal effects are calculated as the average difference in probabilities 
with the indicator taking a value of one and the indicator taking the value of zero. 
        
 
  
∑[  (         )     (         )]
   
   
where again S is the set of negotiations that we use to calculate the average difference. 
  We measure the impact of the adoption of an ESOP by taking the difference of the 
marginal effect for the post-adoption indicator from the marginal effect for the pre-adoption 
indicator. While we have discussed earlier some of the tax and takeover benefits from adopting 
an ESOP, we cannot assume that for unionized firms the decision to adopt an ESOP is 
independent of the bargaining history for that firm. Firms that adopt an ESOP may have 
bargaining outcomes in the pre-adoption period that differ on average from the bargaining 
outcomes for firms that never adopt an ESOP. If we measured the impact of adopting an ESOP 
using only the post-adoption indicator, then we would be assuming that these bargaining 
histories are the same. This could significantly bias the estimated ESOP impact. 
We control for two firm specific variables – the firm size and profitability. We use the 
log of the firm’s assets as our size measure, where information on firm assets is taken from the 
Standard & Poors Compustat database. We capture firm profitability using the firm’s reported  
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net income for the year prior to the contract negotiation. Information on the firm’s net income is 
also taken from Compustat.
20  
All of our probit specifications control for possible cyclical patterns in bargaining using 
aggregate, industry and local labor market controls. Aggregate cyclical conditions are captured 
by a set of year effects. These year effects will also control for changes in bargaining trends over 
time.
21 Conditions in the industry and state labor markets are proxied by a set of employment 
trends and residuals. We fit regression models to the BLS quarterly industry and state-level 
employment series for the period 1970-2002. We allow for quadratic trends, quarterly seasonal 
effects, and autoregressive error terms. 
 
where ln Eit is log quarterly employment in industry/state i at time t; Qj is an indicator variable 
for the j
th quarter; (L) is an up to a second-order distributed lag polynomial; and it is a white 
noise error term. We measure the tightness in the relevant labor market using the estimated 
quarterly employment residual, Uit. We also include the estimated current employment growth 
rate (i1+2 i2t) as a measure of longer-term performance in the industry or state.
22 
Our estimation results are presented in Table 4. Specification (1) gives the marginal 
                                                 
20 The firm’s assets are taken from item # 6, while net income variable is item #172 in Compustat. 
21 For example, strike incidence has declined by roughly 50% over this twenty-five year period. 
22 We also control for 2-digit industry effects as well as state effects. This implies that the industry and 
state trend employment effects are identified off of the time-varying component of the employment 
trends,  2 i  . 
  ,   +   U   (L)   =   U
U   +   Q        +   t     +   t     +     =   E  





i2 i1 i0 it
 
     ln
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effects on the likelihood of a strike, while specification (2) gives the marginal effects on the 
likelihood of a strike given that a dispute has occurred. For negotiations that involve a bargaining 
unit that adopts an ESOP, we restrict the sample to those ESOPs where we observe the size of 
the ESOP. We split these ESOPs into those that involved more or less than 10 percent of the 
firm’s equity (where 10 percent is the median ESOP size). 
Before discussing the estimates of the impact of ESOPs on bargaining outcomes, we will 
briefly summarize the findings for the other control variables in Table 4. We find that the 
incidence of strikes as well as the fraction of labor disputes involving a strike declines with firm 
size as measured by the log of firm assets. Controlling for the size of the firm, we find no effect 
of the size of the bargaining unit on any of the bargaining outcome measures. The likelihood of a 
strike as well as the fraction of disputes that involve a strike increases with a firm’s profitability 
as measured by the firm’s net income. Controlling for the firm’s profitability, strikes are more 
likely in states that are experiencing above trend employment at the time of the negotiations.  
The overall impact of ESOPs on strikes and the composition of labor disputes is 
summarized at the bottom of Table 4. Contrary to expectations based on the model, the data 
indicate little effect on bargaining outcomes associated with the adoption of a large ESOP. For 
these ESOPs the strike and composition estimates are small in magnitude. The results for small 
ESOPs are more consistent with the predictions from the bargaining model. The data indicate 
that firms that adopt a small ESOP have bargaining histories prior to the adoption date that have 
a significantly higher ratio of strikes in their labor disputes. The marginal effect on the dispute 
composition for the pre-ESOP indicator is 9.6 percent for the small ESOPs. Following the 
adoption of the ESOP, there is a large swing in the composition of labor disputes for the adopting 
firms away from strikes. The marginal effect on the strike incidence for the post-ESOP indicator 
is a 5.3 percent reduction, and on the fraction of labor disputes that involve a strike is an 8.1  
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percent reduction. The overall ESOP effects associated with the small ESOPs are a reduction in 
the incidence of strikes by 5.7 percent and a shift in the composition of labor disputes away from 
strikes of 17.7 percent. The composition effect is statistically significant, while the strike effect is 
not precisely measured. The magnitude of the strike incidence effect for the small ESOPs is 
comparable to the overall calibrated marginal effects given in Table 3, while the magnitude of 
the dispute composition effect is 80 percent higher than the overall calibrated marginal effect. 
5.  Shareholder and Labor Wealth Effects 
In this section, we analyze the shareholder wealth associated with the announcement of 
an ESOP adoption. While the market reaction to an announcement of a new ESOP has been 
documented in the literature, we provide new evidence on the announcement gains/losses 
disaggregated by the collective bargaining status of the firm. If ESOPs improve the efficiency of 
contract negotiations and if these efficiency gains are shared between the union and the firm, 
then we would expect to see these gains to the shareholders capitalized into the announcement 
effect of a union ESOP. We measure these announcement effects using an event-time 
methodology as described in MacKinaly (1997). We calculate cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) over three intervals around the announcement date of ESOP. We also normalize the gain 
or loss by the number of employees to find out the average gain/loss to each worker.
23 
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics on the firms in our overall (union and non-union) 
ESOP sample where we know the exact date of the ESOP adoption.
24 We report information on 
                                                 
23 We take the number of employees for the year of ESOP adoption for each firm as reported by the 
Standard & Poor’s Compustat database.  It should be noted that the results reported here do not change if 
we choose the number of employees in the year before the year of ESOP adoption.  The daily returns used 
in our study are collected from the Center for Research in Security Prices. 
 
24 The ESOP sample declines from 602 to 147 when we restrict ourselves to ESOPs where we know the 
announcement date. This dating information is important for conducting an event study of the stock 
market reaction to the announcement of the ESOP.  
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firm size (measured by the book value of assets and employment), growth opportunities 
(measured by market to book ratio), and the size of the ESOP as a percentage of shares 
outstanding. Our sample of ESOP firms on average has nearly $5.0 billion in assets. Unionized 
firms, with an average size of $10.6 billion are about 3.4 times larger than the non-unionized 
firms. An average firm in our ESOP sample has about 21,000 employees. The unionized firms 
have workforces that are double the size of the non-unionized firms. Firms that adopt an ESOP 
have a mean (median) market to book of 1.3 (1.2), indicating growth prospects. Unionized firms 
have a slightly higher market to book than non-unionized firms. ESOPs on average have 11.6% 
of the firm's shares outstanding, with a median equity stake of 8.0%. Appendix B provides 
information on the name of the company, the year of ESOP adoption and percentage shares 
outstanding in the plan for our sample of union ESOPs. 
Table 6 reports the event study results. We report CARs for three event windows (-5,5),  
(-5,1), and (-2,1), where t = -1 is the ESOP announcement date, and t = 0 is the date the 
announcement is reported in the press. For two of the event windows, we include the five days 
prior to the press release to capture any leakage of the news to the markets, although little is 
reported in the literature as to when the firm, if at all, shares the information with its employees 
about the ESOP. CARs for the overall sample of firms are positive and statistically significant 
over each of the three intervals. The eleven-day CAR (-5, 5) and the seven-day CAR (-5,1) are 
1.6% and 1.5% respectively, while the four-day CAR (-2,1) is 1.3%. 
Since our sample is different than those in other studies, we compare the announcement 
returns with findings in three other papers. Our calculated four-day return of 1.3%, is a bit higher 
than that of Beatty (1995) and Chang and Mayers (1992), but is much lower than Chang (1990) 
as reported below. These studies differ because of the type of ESOPs included in the sample. 
Beatty points out that Chang's reported excess return of 3.7% would be reduced to 1.6% if the 35  
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leveraged buyout ESOPs were excluded from his sample. Thus, our announcement return is 
roughly comparable to other studies. 
 
Study  Sample Size  Sample Period  CARs 
Beatty (1995) 
Chang (1990) 











Table 6 also reports CARs disaggregated by the union status of the firm. For the 120 non-
unionized firms, the CARs are slightly smaller for the overall sample of firms. The CARs for the 
27 unionized firms are around fifty percent larger than for the nonunion sample. For the 
unionized firms, the CARs are 2.4% for the interval (-5,5), 2.3% for the interval (-5,1), and 1.7% 
for the interval (-2,1). Whatever the benefits are to firms in general from establishing an ESOP, 
the benefits are considerably larger for unionized firms.  To our knowledge, this feature of the 
data has not been previously noted in the literature. 
  The calibration results displayed in Figure 4 offer some insights into this finding. The 
costs to current shareholders of the firm giving employees an equity stake are the same 
regardless of the union status of the firm. Union and nonunion firms likely benefit equally from 
the tax advantages afforded by establishing an ESOP. If there are important productivity effects 
associated with ESOPs, it is less clear that they would be equally shared by non-union and union 
firms. However, the calibration exercise clearly illustrates that the expected bargaining losses 
associated with labor disputes declines with the size of the union’s equity stake. This creates a 
differential value of an ESOP to union firms which if understood by investors should be 
capitalized in the announcement effect.  
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6.  Conclusion 
Parties that repeatedly negotiate contracts with each other have an incentive to adopt an 
ownership structure that reduces bargaining costs. Cross ownership between a firm and its 
supplier is an example. The cross ownership better aligns the parties’ interests, thus reducing 
bargaining costs. Similarly, ESOPs alter the incentives of a firm and union in ways that help 
reduce the frequency and costs of labor disputes. 
In this paper, we extend standard bargaining models to allow joint ownership. In the case 
of collective bargaining, the theory predicts ESOPs lead to fewer strikes as a fraction of total 
disputes. The presence of an ESOP changes the incentives of the union since it no longer collects 
its rents exclusively through the negotiated wage. We examine the impact of ESOPs on 
collective bargaining outcomes by extending the signaling model of Cramton and Tracy (1992) 
to allow the union to hold an equity stake in the firm. The model predicts that increasing the size 
of the union's equity stake acts to more closely align the union's interests with the interests of the 
firm. A consequence is a reduction in labor disputes and a shift by the union away from the more 
costly strike threat and towards the holdout threat. 
Using data on major collective bargaining negotiations from 1970-1995, we find for 
ESOPs with less than a 10 percent ownership stake evidence consistent with the prediction that 
ESOPs (at least in the short run) reduce the overall incidence of strikes and shift the composition 
of labor disputes towards holdouts. In subsequent negotiations their fraction of labor disputes 
that involve a strike falls below the average for non-adopting bargaining units. The estimated 
magnitudes of the decline in strike incidence and the decline in the fraction of labor disputes that 
involve a strike match up reasonably well to the calibrated estimates from the model. 
The theory suggests that shareholders of unionized firms should experience a differential 
gain from the adoption of an ESOP. We verify this by conducting an event study of the stock  
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market reaction to ESOP adoptions. We find that the stock market reaction to a unionized ESOP 
adoption is 50% larger than for a non-union ESOP adoption. These findings indicate that ESOPs 
may provide firms and unions with a tool to improve the efficiency with which they renegotiate 
labor agreements. A more complete picture requires more data on post-ESOP contract 
negotiations and detailed information on pre- and post-ESOP wage settlements. 
Our analysis applies generally to bargaining settings with shared ownership. Like ESOPs, 
cross ownership should reduce bargaining costs and make collaborations more productive.  
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Table 3: Comparison of Theoretical and Empirical Impact of ESOPs on Collective Bargaining 
  Dispute Incidence  Strike Incidence  Dispute Composition 
Pre-ESOP (theory)  51.8  11.1  21.4 
Post-ESOP (theory)  51.6  5.5  10.7 
ESOP Impact (theory)  –0.2  –5.6  –10.7 
Notes: The theoretical impact of an ESOP is calculated from the benchmark model of section 3, 
using the empirical distribution of ESOP ownership shares.  
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Table 4: Impact of ESOPs on Collective Bargaining 
  Strike Incidence 
      Dispute Composition
a 
  (1)    (2) 
 






Post-ESOP (<10%)  0.053 
(0.041) 
  0.081 
(0.080) 
Pre-ESOP (>10%)  0.002 
(0.019) 
  0.018 
(0.035) 
Post-ESOP (>10%)  0.001 
(0.039) 
  0.002 
(0.064) 













Industry Employment Residual  0.004 
(0.006) 
  0.001 
(0.011) 
 
Industry Employment Trend  0.006 
(0.017) 
  0.037 
(0.027) 
 
State Employment Residual  0.014
** 
(0.007) 
  0.013 
(0.012) 
 
State Employment Trend  0.008 
(0.018) 
  0.000 
(0.029) 
Bargaining Unit Size  0.001 
(0.002) 
  0.001 
(0.004) 
Sample Size  3,917    1,924 
Mean of dependent variable  0.134    0.273 
ESOP (<10%) Impact






c  0.001 
(0.043) 
  0.020 
(0.072) 
Notes: Probit average marginal effects and standard errors. Marginal effects for 
continuous variables correspond to a one standard deviation change in the 
variable and are averaged over the bargaining units that do not adopt an ESOP. 
The pre- and post-ESOP marginal effects for each ESOP size category are 
calculated using the contract negotiations for bargaining units that adopted that 
size of ESOP. Standard errors are calculated using clustering by negotiations for 
the same bargaining unit. Specifications control for negotiation year, 2-digit 
industry, state and union fixed effects.  
a Dispute composition is the ratio of strike to disputes. 
b ESOP (<10%) impact = Post-ESOP (<10%)  Pre-ESOP (<10%) 
c ESOP (>10%) impact = Post-ESOP (>10%)  Pre-ESOP (>10%) 
** significant at the 5% level, 
* significant at the 10% level 
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics of the sample characteristics 
Variable  Sample Size 
a  Mean  Median  Min  Max 
 
Employment (thousands) 
         
All  147  20.9  4.8  .1  520.0 
Non-union  120  16.1  2.8  .1  520.0 
Union  27  42.0  24.7  2.3  186.8 
Book Value of Assets ($ millions)           
All  83  4,974.7  799.0  7.8  61,768.8 
Non-union  62  3,072.1  538.0  7.8  52,984.0 
Union  21  10,592.0  4,274.9  330.2  61,768.8 
Market Value / Book Value 
b           
All  141  1.3  1.2  0.8  2.9 
Non-union  115  1.3  1.2  0.8  2.9 
Union  26  1.3  1.2  0.8  2.1 
ESOP (%)           
All  151  11.6  8.0  .1  75.5 
Non-union  124  11.6  8.0  .1  75.5 
Union    27  11.7  7.0  2.4  60.0 
Notes: 
a Sample size indicates non-missing variables in COMPUSTAT. 
b Defined as price-close calendar year times shares outstanding plus total assets minus common 




   
  36 
. 
 
Table 6. Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR) 
  Sample  (-5,5)  (-5,1)  (-2,1) 











         




    (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.005) 
         




    (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.007) 
Notes: ESOP announcement day (t = -1). Numbers in 
parentheses are standard errors. CARs estimated using the 
market model discussed in MacKinlay (1997). Parameters of the 
model are calculated using returns over the period -260 to -61 
and 61 to 260. 
** significant at the 5% level, 
* significant at the 10% level  
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Figure 2. Payoffs from Bargaining Outcome t, w,  with an ESOP of size  
 
Payoffs During Threat   Payoffs After Settlement 
Loss: (1  a)(v + c) 
Firm: (1  )(v  w) 
Firm: (1  )(a v  b) 
Union: w + (v  w) 






Time of  
Settlement 
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Figure 3. Dispute Incidence as a Function of ESOP Ownership Share 
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Appendix A 
  The proofs of Propositions 1-3 are extensions of similar propositions in Cramton and 
Tracy (1992). As a result only a sketch of the proofs are given. 
Proof of Proposition 1. We begin by establishing the Rubinstein wage when the union has an 
ESOP of size . Then the payoffs during the threat  and after settlement are as shown in Figure 
1. The Rubinstein wage is determined from a pair of indifference relations, which require the 
firm offers a wage f w  and union offers wage  u w , such that each is indifferent between immediate 
acceptance of the other’s offer or waiting and having the other accept their offer after a period of 
delay. Let  be the discount factor between offers. Then the indifference relations for the union 
and firm are 
( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) f f u u w v w x a v b w v w x a v b                        
(1 )( ) (1 )( ) uf v w a v b v w a v b                 . 
Solving for the wage offers yields 
((1 ) )
((1 ) )
(1 )(1 ) 1
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((1 ) )
(1 )(1 ) 1
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a v b x
w a v b
a v b x
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Finally, letting the time between offers go to zero ( 1   ), gives us the Rubinstein wage for the 
threat : 
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  Next we need to determine the firm’s optimal choice of delay, which credibly reveals its 
type. When the firm rejects the union’s offer p, it makes the offer  () wv   after delaying for D(t) 
















The firm selects the delay  to maximize its profits: 
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max[ ( )(1 )( ) (1 ( ))(1 )( )]
1 1 2
max [(1 )( ) ( )( (1 )( ( ) ))]
1 2 2
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The final step in the equilibrium construction is to determine the cutoff value m. When the union 
makes the initial offer 
12
( ) (1 )( )
22




   

, then the firm immediately accepts 
the union’s offer if vm  . Otherwise, the firm with value v delays until D(v) of the contract has 
passed. The union’s utility if there is a dispute is 
22
12
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The union’s utility if there is no dispute is 
( ) ( ( ))
1
(1 ) ( )(1 )( )
2
w m v w m
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The first order condition for maximizing m is 
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Since,  (.) U is a continuous function, the maximum occurs at an interior point m such that the 
first-order condition is satisfied. In addition, the second-order condition must also be satisfied, so   
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Therefore, dispute incidence falls as  increases. 
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Therefore, dispute duration falls as  increases. 
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Therefore, dispute incidence falls as c increases. 
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Therefore, dispute duration falls as c increases. 
 
Finally, we wish to show that a linear mean-preserving spread of the distribution F increases 
both  dispute incidence and  dispute duration. This  follows, because  a linear  mean-preserving 
spread of the distribution is equivalent to a rescaling of the original problem with a smaller c. 
Hence, both dispute incidence and duration increase from the calculations above. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3. The union will select the threat that maximizes its expected payoff. 
Using the first order condition, yields the following equation for its expected payoff:  
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The union will choose strike over holdout if and only if 
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Proof of Proposition 4. Under Assumption S,  
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When v is distributed uniformly then holdout is used more frequently as a threat choice as  
increases. 
 









    

  
When the union is given a small positive share from zero share, then for any distribution of v, 
holdout is used more frequently as a threat choice as  increases.  
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Appendix B 
 
Firms that are covered with Collective Bargaining Units and that adopted ESOPs.  
 
1.1  Company Name  Adoption Date  % ESOP 
Anheuser-Busch Cos Inc  4/27/1989  5.5 
Boise Cascade Corp  5/3/1989  12.89 
Brunswick Corp  4/4/1989  5.97 
Colgate-Palmolive Co  6/20/1989  9.14 
Cummins Engine  7/12/1989  11.08 
Dennison Mfg Co  2/24/1976  5 
FMC Corp  4/14/1989  25.55 
GTE Corp  7/17/1989  3.68 
Lukens Inc  6/29/1989  12.8 
Maytag Corp  6/14/1989  3 
Mobil Corp  12/18/1989  2.44 
National Can Corp  2/20/1985  28.1 
National-Standard Co  12/22/1987  29.87 
Olin Corp  5/26/1989  6.31 
Phillips Petroleum Co  6/16/1988  6.12 
PPG Industries Inc  1/20/1989  14 
Quaker Oats Co  1/18/1989  2.52 
Rath Packing Co  9/24/1979  60 
Republic Airlines Inc  7/3/1984  18 
Sara Lee Corp  4/28/1989  6 
Stanley Works  6/7/1989  7.01 
Texaco Inc  12/12/1988  3.27 
Textron Inc  6/8/1989  4.17 
Tribune Co  4/5/1989  8.5 
United Technologies Corp  7/3/1989  8 
Us Airways Group Inc  8/14/1989  5 
Xerox Corp  7/11/1989  11.5 
 
  